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On Philosophies of Music
Education: Selected
Issues Revisited
By Franz L. Roelunann
University of Colorado at Denver
n

the last decade of the twentieth century, the profession of music education, in a continuing effort to clarify its
role in contemporary society, finds itself developing philosophic positions which raise
some very interesting issues. For example,
the idea that intelligence in humans can be
described as a multiplicity of more or less
distinctive potentials seems in some cases to
have led to conclusions which are imprecise
and highly speculative. There is, for example, a lack of persuasive evidence to support the existence of varying disparate intelligences, musical or otherwise, or a persistent
right hemispheric dominance in brain functioning related to music. In fact, as will be
seen in the following section, a significant
body of data challenges these points of view.
There also appears to be a preoccupation
with art/nonart, music/nonmusic considerations while undervaluing the inborn capacity of all humans to transform concrete experience, musical and otherwise, into the perception of expressive patterns and forms,
and the importance of developing this potential through education. Additionally, to suggest that music education is an education of
the feelingful distorts the inherent bonding of
feeling and thought in humans, creating an
artificial distinction which, because it flies in
the face of common sense, is difficult to articulate and defend in public arenas. These
difficulties, which are major obstacles in the
more general advocacy of public music education, are to a large extent the result of an
illogical distinction between philosophy and
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advocacy. Simply stated, to have a philosophy is to advocate a point of view-and
in
that respect, it helps to be understood.

Modes of Knowing
Is there only one general form of cognition
(knowing), or is cognition multifaceted' That
is to say, is intelligence, mental functioning,
more diverse and disparate, distinctive and
essentially different than we had thought?
And, if so, to what extent does thinking in
one mode develop the capacity to think in
other modes; or is it the case that thinking in
a particular mode has little influence on
other modes of thought because of the
uniqueness of each?
Such questions raise several problems.
First is the difficult interplay of terms often
used in ways that seem more or less comparable: knowing, cognition, capacity to think,
mental function, modes of thought, and intelligence. Second, the idea of multiple and
disparate domains of intelligence as an adequate model of mental functioning, a view
proposed at va lying times and in varying
forms throughout modern history, is, because
of its speculative nature, a shaky premise on
which to base philosophic thinking. And
third, to extend this compartmentalized
model of the mind by suggesting that each
domain of intelligence is without much influence on other domains is to build speculation upon speculations.
Taking these issues one at a time, it is my
understanding that the varying terms used to
describe what's going on in the brain, while
having some shared meanings, are sufficiently distinctive to weaken a discussion that
presents them either as synonymous or in
such close contiguity as to make them ap-
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pear as comparable or interchangeable.
I
derstanding of how the brain works.
will leave it to others with particular experAlso difficult is the idea that cognition is
tise in the functioning of the brain and nerdisparate in its several modalities. The idea
vous system to clarify the subtle and not-sothat the mind's functioning can be parsed
subtle distinctions among them. For the purinto several essentially different domains all
poses of this discussion, the importance of
too easily reinforces a misconception widely
carefully chosen terminologies, especially when
held in music education circles, namely, that
speaking about constructs as elusive as the
music educates the right brain (whatever
mind and its functioning, is considerable.
This
might be meant by the term "educates").
is not to encourage simplistic
This unproven and, at best,
reductions that make difficult
oversimplified notion was
ideas sound trivial, but a plea
recently reiterated in a
We must be caufor a consistent
language
Newsweek magazine article
prudently chosen and carein
which a report by the
tious about the
fully defined.
National Commission of
reliability of a
Multiple intelligences is a
Music Education on "Growcase in point. Gardner (985)
ing
Up Complete: The Im'separate but
repeatedly cautions that his
perative for Music Educaequal' model of
division of the mind's function" is quoted as saying
tioning into seven intelligences
that without arts education,
disparate domains
American children may
is hardly a proven, scientific
of intelligence; the grow up to be "right-brain
fact; that it is, in fact an idea
that has (again) regained the
damaged. "
concept didn't
right to be discussed seriously.
Positing that the brain is
"W"ork
"W"ell
as the
essentially bicameral, with
For philosophers to argue their
each hemisphere having a
positions from another's theobasis for social
retical writing, the many clearly
discrete function, is at once
policy and seems
stated cautions by the latter
convenient and inadequate.
notwithstanding, is something
In fact, any model that diequally inadthat is better avoided, or at the
vides the potential of the
equate as a basis
very least made clear in their
brain into x, y, or z numbers
of more or less discrete funcexposition.
on "W"hich
to
tions will, given present unThose
who
interpret
model the funcGardner's work might conderstandings, be convenient
and
inadequate: convenient
sider the mind more in terms
tioning of the
of multiple potentials and less
because it's easier to think of
mind.
parts than it is to understand,
in terms of multiple intelligences. There are, I think,
let alone describe, the
good reasons for this. First,
interconnectedness
of parts;
intelligence is all too often
inadequate because it fails to
account for the potential of
thought of by the general
the mind to mediate perception, understandcommunity as something one does or does not
ing, and feelings. Moreover, to assume the
have-those
scoring above 100 on IQ tests
degree of hemispheric specialization implied
have it, those scoring below 100 don't. Second, intelligence, especially as quantified by
by the National Commission on Music Education report cited in Newsweek is to fly in the
IQ tests, is often wrongly perceived as someface of evidence to the contrary and, to those
thing fixed at birth, immutable and without
potential for change. Third, we are a long
interested enough to try to understand us,
way from understanding what human intellimakes us appear naive.
PET (Positron Emission Tomography) scan
gence is and how it functions. And last, the
idea of intelligence as a complex of potenstudies and studies of subjects with brain lesions give evidence of just how oversimplitials seems better to capture our current un-
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"All hU1TIanShave the potential to create artful constructs vvhich

give a fullness of meaning to their perceptions and activity."
fied this common conception is. Using music stimuli (chords), PET studies by Mazziotta
et al., 0982; 1984) show bilateral parietotemporal activations and diffuse right greater
than left frontotemporal asymmetries. His
studies also show that paired sequences of
pitches to be identified as same-different produce hemispheric asymmetries that differ by
the subject's analysis strategy. Eustache et
al., (990) found that a patient with a left
temporoparietal lesion evidenced difficulties
in understanding and repeating verbal material and impaired identification of melodies.
In another instance (Assai & Butter, 1983), it
was found that a bilingual, virtuoso piano
teacher who had a perfectly demarked lesion
located in the left posterior temporoparietal
region of the brain developed both aphasia
(impairment of spoken or written language)
and amusia (impairment of musical intoning
and inflection of language).
Finally, Lechevalier, et al., (984) report
the case of a 33-year-old woman with a bilateral temporal lobe lesion, predominantly on
the left side and extending into the adjacent
parietal and frontal lobes, who could not
identify rhythms, pitch, melodies or different
types of music, but whose perception of the
musical quality of sound stimuli and musical
pleasure were spared. From this and similar
cases, the researchers hypothesize the existence of several levels in the integration of
musical stimuli, the most elementary of
which might be the perception of the musical
quality of the sounds.
Thus, it appears that depending on the
varying musical and cognitive conditions
present, many parts of the brain are activated
when humans engage in musical tasks. What
specifically is going on in the brain? We
don't fully know. What we can say is that
the metabolic activity of the brain when processing musical information is not necessarily
localized to the right or left hemisphere, or
necessarily localized to centers of pattern
perception, and that how one processes the
information is as important as what form the
information takes. We can also say that
42
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brain lesions in both the right and the left
hemisphere can have profound effects on the
ability to process musical information or to
engage in activities that are in some respect
musical, and that cortical deafness affects
musical perception in complex and unexpected ways. We must, therefore, be cautious about the reliability of a "separate but
equal" model of disparate domains of intelligence; the concept didn't work well as the
basis for social policy and seems equally inadequate as a basis on which to model the
functioning of the mind.
The likelihood that "intelligences" other
than the musical may also evidence complex
mediations and interconnections further challenges the idea of isolable modes of thinking.
Were thinking in one mode exclusive to that
mode, with little influence on other modes of
thinking, it would place robust constraints on
the readily observed ability of humans to
generalize experience across these theoretical
modalities. This, I suggest, is not a secure
basis from which to declare that thinking is
mode specific and that it has little influence
on other modes of thought.
It does seem to be the case that music presents the listener with a particular type of
knowing; that it functions as an expressive
symbol which allows the listener to grasp, to
conceive of, explicitly and in marvelous detail, forms of felt life. But to suggest that
only music has this power is to frame an
overly narrow analysis. Music, by which I
mean sound ordered with expressive intent,
is at one end of the sound continuum. At
the other end is an infinite range of random
sounds generated environmentally and routinely perceived expressively. In the central
areas of this continuum are found a staggering array of sounds created (also made) to
serve ordinary life. One example is the inevitable oneness of discursive and expressive
symbols in discourse. That is to say, communication by speech, to inform or persuade, is
a blending of words and intoned symbols.
Where the blend is absent, a deficit is immediately sensed, possibly an eccentricity or,
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more seriously, a symptom of neurosis or
psychosis, or aphasia or amusia. Where the
blend is balanced, one finds a richness of
expression where musical qualities inform
verbal meanings.
One can, of course, make the point that
rudimentary intonings are musical only
within a very broad (some might say excessively broad) consideration of the musical.
But such an argument no longer focuses on
the question of whether one mode of knowing can influence or inform another mode,
but rather has shifted to a question of what
can and cannot be appropriately subsumed
under the heading of music; or more precisely, where does music as an art leave off
and music as a utilitarian handmaiden begin-an entirely different matter.

Art-Nonart: Music-Nonmusic
Any discussion about what is and is not art,
or more specifically, music, has a quality of
arbitrariness about it. Where, exactly, does
one draw the line? As often as not, how the
discussion is framed is fundamental to the
eventual conclusions. If the discussion is
framed by two options, for example, between
artistic expression and communication, it must
be recognized that the context is, in fact, binary, either-or, and that the options have, by
and large, been proscribed. Or when contrasting making and creating, the choice is again
binary, framed by the two given choices. This
rhetorical strategy creates a problem, namely,
that the framework of the discussion sets limitations on the range of possibilities one might
consider, creating a circumstance where another option, one not considered within the
proscribed framework, is possible.
For example, suppose our discussion
started by recognizing that all humans have
the potential to transform experience; that is,
to shift freely from conceptual terms to expressive forms of experience and back again.
For an agronomist, this may mean looking at
the sky to take note of cloud types and formations and to weigh the possibility of precipitation, and then, in an instant, to perceive
the clouds as dynamic forms, only to return
again to the making of meteorologic judgments, and returning to a valuing of the
cloud formations as beautiful in and of them-
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selves, for their intrinsic patterns which arrest
his interest. For a mathematician, it might be
to move from algorithmic formulations to a
consideration of their propositional elegance
to the perception of them as an expressive
metaphor, thereby moving through modalities of science, connoiseurship, and poetics,
or, stated another way, through
conceptualization, contemplation, and expression. And so it goes; a constant shifting
between the conceptual (knowledge about)
to the aesthetic (knowledge 00, which leads
to a first principle: The human species is
marked by the potential to transform concrete experience into the perception of expressive patterns and forms; to transform the
conceptual into the aesthetic.
What about the thing perceived? Must it
be an art object, as that phrase is traditionally
used? Not necessarily, as illustrated above.
The expressive forms that humans create
range from what we commonly call art objects to products and acts that are far less formalized. What is speech without gesture,
without the qualities of dance; without intonation and the qualities of song; without
metaphor and the qualities of poetry? So, in
addition to our inherent potential to transform experience, humans also create forms
of feeling not because we have graduated
from a school of fine and performing arts,
but because we, as a species, are innately
marked by the capacity to do so; which leads
to a second principle: All humans have the
potential to create artful constructs which '
give a fullness of meaning to their perceptioris and activity.
Seen in its entirety, art is both ubiquitous
and varied in its form and in the power of its
expression. Fine art (to attach a label to those
works created primarily as expressive forms),
then, exists as a particular subset of an infinite
number of objects or events that can be perceived aesthetically. All must be given their
due. To draw a line between fine art and the
more general manifestations of our inborn creativity is again to create a dualism that serves
neither social nor educational policy.
When the potential of humans to transform
experience is given full weight, distinctions
between manufacture and creation, expression and communication, contemplation and
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utility, and other art-nonart binaries, become
blurred. What stands in sharp relief is the
innate potential shared by all humans to shift
perception freely between the conceptual,
the knowing about, and the aesthetic, the
knowing of, and to give outward evidence of
this ability. The development and refinement
of this potential should, I think, be the basis
of music, and more generally, arts education.

Thinking- Feeling
The Cartesian postulate, cognito, ergo sum,
continues to be one of the most powerful
ideas to enter Western thought; we can only
wonder how different our cultural thought
forms might have been had it been postulated,
sentio, el;go sum. In either case, the separation
of thinking from feeling seems inconsistent
with the actual experience of life. Is it possible to think without feeling, or feel without
thinking? It may be convenient to think-feel
about these as if they were isolable, unitary-inthemselves aspects of human potential, but
doing so does not necessarily promote mental
health or useful philosophy.
Taking an empirical look at the everyday
world (very practical, very unscientific), it
becomes readily apparent that our common,
ordinary sense of normalcy is tied to the interplay of three global domains: our capacity
to think, to feel, and to move (see, for example: Bloom, 1956, 1964, 1972). Neither
thinking nor feeling, or for that matter, thinking and feeling, necessarily results in movement. That is to say, one can have a thought
and its associated feeling(s) of value or worth
in an attitude of pure contemplation, no
movement being impelled or required. On
the other hand, movement is invariably tied
to thoughts and feelings expressed as motives, as, for example, when an acoustical
idea engenders a feeling of musical promise
and leads one to compose.
The point is that while movement can be
independent of thinking and feeling, thinking
and feeling cannot be independent of each
other. In fact, when the integration of a
person's thinking and feeling is disturbed, we
find it "odd" or "weird" and intuitively grasp
that something is amiss. We say the individual is eccentric or, depending on the degree of perceived disintegration, neurotic or
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psychotic, or possibly suffers from a physical
cause like a tumor or brain lesion.
By focusing so strongly on feeling, it is
easy for philosophers to create the impression that music education is about the education of feeling, period. The humanities, social sciences, and the natural and physical
sciences deal with cognition, concepts, and
"knowledge about;" this is their primary
realm. The arts (music) deal with feelings,
affect, sentience, and the direct expression of
"knowledge of" the feelingful. Thus the
myth of the separation of thinking from feeling is perpetuated.
Is it any wonder, then,
that the arts are so often misconstrued as being touchy-feely, soft, without intellectual
substance, and of little more than peripheral
educational import?
But thinking and feeling are not separable
from each other. It seems, therefore, more
useful to think of the arts as the embodiment
of concept and affect in dynamic form.
Whether the emphasis of a particular piece
of music is on the conceptual (referential,
utilitarian) or the aesthetic (expressive, dynamic) is less important than the development of an understanding
about all musics
and a refinement of the ability to delight in
their several aspects. Like the inborn potential for language, the ability to perceive music conceptually and aesthetically must be
nurtured and developed, refined through
education and experience.
To do otherwise
is to diminish the fullness of human potential. The bedrock of our profession is to insure against this loss and to provide for the
fullest possible development of our thinkingfeeling potential.

Advocacy and Philosophy
In part because of the pragmatic "let's get on
with it" nature of American society and in part
because of the inherent complexities of philosophical formulations-that
is, their proper
concern with logic, internal coherence and
precise definitions-it
is, under most circumstances, extremely difficult to articulate a
philosophically based argument in support of
music education to a board of education, or
parent, or alderman. This is no small matter.
A set of beliefs and values that can, with patience, be internalized by professionals, but
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"Philosophy and advocacy, like Watson's double helix, form a
singularity. "
that pose very real problems when externally
communicated, is half a loaf. It accomplishes
a very important first step, namely, to make
moot the angst of professional and personal
self-doubt and defensiveness.
That's the good
news.
On the other hand, there remains the need
to externalize these beliefs and values in a
manner that is both understandable
and compelling to the minds of laity; and here the
news is not so good. Allowing for the fact
that most who delve into Langer, Meyer,
Gardner, Dewey, Broudy, et al., come away
with a reasonably good sense of the matter,
we still find that graduate students, practicing
professionals, and academics in music education are often hard pressed to articulate their
philosophy of music and music education in
public arenas in more than unconvincing
over-simplifications
or to speak in a jargon
understood only by initiated cohorts. The
good news is that there are people in the
field of music education who are deeply engaged in the development of a set of professional beliefs and values, some of which
have taken intellectual and emotional root in
the profession (internalization); the bad news
is that we continue to have great difficulty
translating these in ways which are understandable by constituencies with which we
must communicate (externalization).
It is important for philosophy to be a tool
for advocacy; that, in fact, there not be a division between philosophy, the internalization
of ideas, and advocacy, their externalization.
The idea of advocacy is not rooted in debating
points or the crass search for any and all possible advantage, but rather in the ability to be
understood.
It is the latter which can bond
the profession of music education-but
only if
we can find ways to share our beliefs and values in a manner which remains true to them
and allows them to be understood by others.
Philosophy and advocacy, like Wat'ion's
double helix, form a singularity.
A final point on the issue of advocacy has to
do with philosophic exclusivity. That is to say,
referentialists have historically argued
Volume 11, Number 3
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extrarnusical considerations, absolutists have
historically denied these by arguing that music
is by and large an acoustic phenomenon, and,
more recently, absolute expressionists (e.g.,
Reimer, 1989), arguing the principles of aesthetic education, have relegated both former
positions to a secondary status. Might it not
be the case that each of these positions speaks
to a valid and important consideration about
music? Surely music is utilitarian, whether to
serve religious and social ritual or the speed of
shopping carts; one can also find deep meaning in its formal elements, their presentation,
combination and development.
The question
of which of these positions is "most correct"
seems less important than the recognition that
they all address aspects of meaning that attract
and involve people in musical activity. As
such, their importance should neither be
trivialized nor minimalized.
We are placed in a double bind when philosophy is both complex and exclusionary,
I
am reminded of Nietzsche's wish, expressed
in Tbe Case Against Wagner, to be taken to
the south of France, where the feet can
dance. It's another way of saying that there
can be a stifling quality about the constraints
of anyone philosophic point of view. Aesthetic perception of music is important, very
important, and needs to be considered seriously by music educators.
It must be understood that in the realm of the aesthetic one
finds a basic and powerful aspect of music.
But this need not lead to an undervaluing of
other understandings
about and appreciations for music that capture the imagination
of and bring delight to people of all cultures.

Conclusions
Music sounds the way feelings feel (as I
once read somewhere in Langer). But many
other manifestations of music are also true
and important. It is, I think, less a matter of
one or another aspect of music being placed
in a position of ascendancy or centrality and
more a matter of the several significant aspects of music that should concern music
educators.
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This is a position that is less tidy than most
philosophers would like. Where's the
ineducable truth of the matter? My response is
that contemporary music education philosophy convincingly argues an aesthetic truth
about music, one all too often overlooked or
minimized by music educators, namely, that
music presents the dynamics of human feeling
in audible form. In the same breath, I am reminded that there are other truths about music, about people, and about how these two
come together. Canto, ergo sum: I sing,
therefore I am CBjorkvold, 1990).

References
Ames, Katrine and Todd Barrett. (Mar. 25, 1991)
Fantasies for an orchestra. Newsweek, p. 55.
Assal, G., and]. Buttet (983) Agraphia and
preservation of music writing in a bilingual
piano teacher. Revue Neurologique (Paris),
139 (0), p. 569-574
Bjorkvold, John-Roar
(990)
Canto-ergo sum.
In Wilson, F. and F. Roehmann (Eds.), Music and Child Development. St. Louis: MMB
Music, pp. 1l7-135.
Bloom, B. S., et at. (956)
Taxonomy of educa-

tional objectiues. The cognitive domain;
(1964) Taxonomy of educational objectives:
The affective domain, and (972) A tax-

onomy of the psychomotor domain: A guide
for developing
behavioral objectives. New
York: David McKay.
Eustache, F., B. Lechevalier, F. Viader,]. Lambert. (990)
Identification and discrimination disorders in auditory perception: A report on two cases. Neuropsycbologia,
28
(3), pp. 257-270.
Gardner, Howard. (985)
Frames of mind.
New York: Basic Books.
Lechevalier, B., Y. Rossa, F. Eustache, C.
Schupp, L. Boner, C. Bazin. (984)
A case
of cortical deafness sparing the music area.
Revue Neurologique (Paris), 140 (3), pp. 19020l.
Mazziotta,]., M. E. Phelps, R. E. Carson, D. E.
Kuhl. (1982) Tomographic mapping of human cerebral metabolism: Auditory stimulation. Neurology, 32 (9), pp. 921-937.
Reimer, Bennett. (1989) A philosophy of music
education (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N]:
Prentice-Hall.
Thomas, Lewis. (1984) Late night thoughts on
listening to Mahler's Ninth Symphony. New
York: Bantam Books, p. 79. ~

~11!l~~®li~1i1l
of the Council for Research in Music Education

Table of Contents, NO.1 09, Summer 1991
Articles
Music Participation: Theory, Research, and Policy
--J. Terry Gates
Some Directions for Reseach in Elementary General Music
--Betty W. Atterbury
Measurement of Solo Instrumental Music Performance: A Review of Literature
--Stephen F. Zdzinski
Dissertation Reviews
All of This Music Belongs to the Nation: The Federal Music Project of the WPA and American
Cultural Nationalism, 1935-1939--Kenneth J. Bindas
Reviewed by Gordon Sandford
Spectral Analysis of Choral Singing Involving Oral Manipulation and Maintenance of Vowel
Intelligibility --Erik Paul Christiansen
Reviewed by Jay Wilkey
An Assessment of Musical Cognitive Processes Used by Children to Compare Phrase Types Within
a Song--Gregory F. DeNardo
Reviewed by Graham F . Welch
An Examination of the Uses of Music in Selected Licensed Preschools in the State of Ohio-Kimberly Moody Golden
Reviewed by Marvin Greenberg
For subscription information, contact: Council for Research in Music Education, School of Music,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1114 West Nevada Street, Urbana, IL 61801.

46
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/vrme/vol16/iss2/24

The Quarterlyjournal

of Music Teaching and Learning

8

